BIO logical agents: Norms, beliefs, intentions in defeasible logic by Governatori, Guido & Rotolo, Antonino
BIO Logical Agents:
Norms, Beliefs, Intentions in Defeasible Logic
Guido Governatori and Antonino Rotolo
Abstract
In this paper we follow the BOID (Belief, Obligation, Intention, Desire) architec-
ture to describe agents and agent types in Defeasible Logic. We argue, in particular,
that the introduction of obligations can provide a new reading of the concepts of
intention and intentionality. Then we examine the notion of social agent (i.e., an
agent where obligations prevail over intentions) and discuss some computational
and philosophical issues related to it. We show that the notion of social agent either
requires more complex computations or has some philosophical drawbacks.
1 Introduction and Motivation
Reasoning about mental attitudes is a traditional issue in philosophy and has been
widely investigated in the field of AI. Some classical agent systems based on men-
tal attitudes such as beliefs, desires and intentions are, for example, those presented in
[6, 9, 33].
More recent works on cognitive agents tried combine two apparently independent
perspectives [8, 18, 11, 10, 12, 13]: (a) a classical cognitive account of agents that
specifies their mental attitudes; (b) modelling agents’ behaviour by means of normative
concepts. For the first approach, the background is basically the belief-desire-intention
(BDI) architecture, where mental attitudes are taken as primitives to give rise to a
set of Intentional Agent Systems [33, 6]. This view is interesting especially when
the behaviour of agents is the outcome of a rational balance among their (possibly
conflicting) mental states. The normative aspect is rather based on the assumption
that normative concepts play a role to characterise the idea of social co-ordination of
autonomous agents [32]. The nice result of this combination of perspectives is that of
leading to an account of agents’ deliberation and behaviour in terms of the interplay
between mental attitudes and normative (external) factors such as obligations.
A crucial aspect in this recent trend is that reasoning about agents can be embedded
in frameworks based on non-monotonic logics, as one the most interesting problems
concerns the cases where the agent’s mental attitudes are in conflict or when they are
incompatible with obligations and other deontic provisions. In this specific perspective,
the relation between mental attitudes and non-monotonicity should not sound surpris-
ing: works such as Thomason’s [36] and on BOID [8] confirm this trend. Of particular
interest is the BOID architecture, which in fact provides a number of strategies for solv-
ing conflicts among mental attitudes and obligations. BOID specifies logical criteria (i)
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to retract agent’s attitudes with the changing environment, and so (ii) to settle conflicts
by stating different general policies corresponding to the agent type considered. Agent
types correspond to the different ways through which conflicts are detected and solved:
a realistic agent thus corresponds to a conflict-resolution type in which beliefs override
all other factors, while other agent types, such as simple-minded, selfish or social ones
adopt different orders of overruling.
Following [18, 11, 10], in this paper we take advantage of this research line and dis-
cuss how the combination of mental attitudes and obligations can be framed in Defeasi-
ble Logic (DL). As is well-known, DL is based on a logic programming-like language
and it is a simple, efficient but flexible non-monotonic formalism able to deal with
many different intuitions of non-monotonic reasoning and recently applied in many
fields. In addition, several efficient implementations have been developed [25, 4]. Here
we discuss and extend some aspects of a non-monotonic logic of agency, based on the
framework of [2], developed in [11, 10].
Why DL? Indeed, DL is one of the most expressive languages that allows for the
definition of large sets of agent types. In particular, the aim of this article is to address
the following issues:
1. We will devise an extension of DL able to cover a number of different agent
types, but which, despite its expressiveness, is computationally feasible. We will
prove that it is possible to compute the complete set of consequences of a given
theory in linear time, thus preserving the nice computational features of standard
DL.
2. On the other hand, we will argue that the notion of agent type can be problematic.
The discussion will be devoted to some philosophical and computational aspects
of the notion of “social agent”, by which we mean a norm-complying agent1.
However, we will argue that similar considerations also apply to other agent
types.
Our system, which considers here three components –Beliefs, Intentions, and Obliga-
tions (BIO agents)– has some substantial peculiarities that make it different from other
frameworks such as BOID’s2. In particular,
• the system develops a constructive account of those modalities that correspond
to mental states and obligations; rules are thus meant to devise suitable logical
1The term “social agent” is taken from previous literature, and in particular from works on the BOID
architecture and some of our earlier papers. We preferred not to change this terminology to avoid confusion.
Other terms could be used, such as “respectful” or “obedient”. However, “social” does not have here any
moral connotations and does not imply that a norm-complying agent has some positive attitude towards
others. (Of course this may be the case, but we do not necessarily suggest this intuitive reading for norm-
complying agents.) The term “social” simply stresses the contrast with other agent types, such as “selfish
agent” (internal vs. external motivations). Analogously, the term “deviant” does not have, too, any moral
connotation: it is taken from social sciences to denote precisely what we describe in our paper.
2The choice of excluding desires is only motivated by offering a simpler presentation of the logic. Social
agents, according to the previous literature (e.g., [8, 11, 10]), are minimally those for which obligations over-
ride conflicting intentions. The inclusion of desires would not substantially change the inference mechanism
presented in Section 3. In addition, adding desires would not affect the computational results presented in
the paper. All results applicable to the relation between intentions and obligations hold for a similar relation
between obligations and desires.
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conditions for introducing modalities; if so, rules may also contain modalised
literals;
• possible conversions of a modality into another can be accepted, as when the
applicability of rule leading to derive, for example, OBLp (p is obligatory) may
permit, under appropriate conditions, to obtain INTp (p is intended).
We believe that both these aspects are necessary to account for some relatively sim-
ple, but important reasoning patterns. In particular, we maintain that conversions are
required to capture some aspects of agents’ rationality. In fact, conversions permit to
derive, for example, intentions from beliefs. As we shall see, these reasoning patterns
are suitable for modelling the so-called side-effect problem. Usually, side effects are
not considered as a part of the intentional sphere of agents, but this analysis is not
always satisfactory when we have to check effects against obligations and possible
normative violations. In presence of obligations regulating agent’s behaviour, a sat-
isfactory model for agent’s rationality should suggest that some side effects (but not
all) are intended. Indeed, conversions correspond to an inferential mechanism that is
precisely meant to capture this fact. But, at this point, the conclusion will be that the
notion of social agent gets problematic (point 2 above).
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical background
of our system. In particular, since the concept of social agent focuses on the interplay
between obligations and intentions, we will discuss which kind of intentions have to
be considered in this regard. Section 3 will present our logical framework, based on
DL, which will embed our intuitions and permit to deal with BIO agents. Section 4
presents a first discussion of the notion of agent type; in particular, we will argue that
conversions, too, are relevant in identifying specific cognitive profiles for the agents;
the section ends with an open problem concerning the feasibility of agent types based
on the strategies for solving conflicts. Section 5 deals with the computational complex-
ity of social agency. A concluding section on related work completes the paper.
2 Norms, Beliefs and Intentions
The focus of this paper is on the so-called policy-based attitudes. The term was coined
by Bratman [7] with specific reference to the idea of intention. For example, I have
a policy to patch up and reboot the Unix server in the department once every month.
This morning, on the basis of this policy, I form the intention to reboot the machine at
7.00 PM in the evening. My intention this morning to reboot the machine this evening
is a policy-based intention. This specific intention will play a major part in my plan-
ning process for the day, as it will pose problems about means and constrain my other
options.
Hence, intentions of this type concern potentially recurring circumstances in an
agent’s life. A policy-based intention is such that it is not simply a case of retaining
an intention previously formed. Neither is it based on a full-blown deliberation where
an attempt is made to weigh pros and cons for and against conflicting options. It also
differs from an intention in favour of necessary means, i.e., an intention in favour of a
specific end, in the sense that the defeasibility of general policies makes it possible to
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block the application of the policy to the particular case without abandoning the policy.
Otherwise one could abandon the intention in favour of the end. The peculiarity policy-
based intentions is that in each case the policy concerns a kind of circumstance that is
expected to recur in the agent loop and in each case the agent might well have a general
intention to act in the particular circumstances. Whether the agent is able to perform
that action or not depends on the circumstances.
As argued in detail elsewhere [16], it may happen that a policy-based intention
needs to be re-considered if not blocked for the application to particular cases. But this
does not mean that the agent should know all such conditions in a scenario, but only
those she considers necessary for the intended outcome and that she is not confident of
their being satisfied. To intend the necessary consequence the agent has to make sure
that all the evidence to the contrary has been defeated, which is basically a defeasible
conclusion.
The starting point of this paper is to extend the policy-based approach to other
attitudes and motivational factors such as beliefs and obligations (see [20] for a similar
idea). In this way, all motivational factors are naturally represented within a rule-
based system: intentions and beliefs are viewed as constituting the internal constraints
(based on policies) of an agent while obligations are her external constraints (based on
rules). As constraints they are defeasible. Notice, in particular, that such an extension
to obligations can capture the well-known defeasible character of deontic reasoning.
In this last case, a policy-based obligation –conceived of as an external motivational
attitude– turns out to be simply a conditional obligation, namely, a rule that allows for
the inference of an obligation whenever the antecedent of this rule holds [30, 34].
2.1 Expected Side Effects and Agents’ Rationality
As we mentioned in Section 1, a satisfactory model for agent’s rationality sometimes
requires that a side effect should be intended, even though we cannot properly say it
was directly wanted by the agent.
It is quite common to distinguish between actions performed intentionally and un-
intentionally. But it is philosophically hard to explain what the distinction precisely
amounts to. For instance, some philosophers argued that an action is not properly in-
tentional if the agent does not have the intention to perform it [1, 26]. On the other
hand, it is somehow reasonable to say that an agent, who did not specifically intend
to perform an action, intentionally performed it. This idea is more clear when we just
have a look at the philosophical debate on the problem of side effects. Imagine an
agent does A to achieve B and knows that A will also produce some other result C. If
the agent’s motivation is only the desire to obtain B, can we say that the agent’s action
was fully intentional with respect to C? Some philosophers argued that, insofar as the
side effect is viewed as dangerous or somehow unpleasant (“it is harming the environ-
ment”), people are psychologically inclined to think that the agent acted intentionally;
when the side effect is “helping the environment”, most people are inclined to think the
contrary ([21]; for a general discussion see, e.g., [27, 35]). Of course, it is outside the
scope of this paper to provide the reader with a philosophical answer to these thorny
questions. But there is a lesson that we can learn from this debate: we may sometimes
have good reasons to include in the intentional sphere of agents some side effects. In
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the remainder, we will not offer substantial criteria to establish what effects should be
accepted as intentional (a problem for which no real consensus has emerged among
philosophers). We will simply offer a logical analysis of this idea and justify the in-
clusion of side effects when an agent is acting in an environment where obligations
regulate her behaviour.
Let us examine Michael Bratman’s idea of agent’s rationality. Bratman plays an im-
portant role in our case: Not only he was the first who introduced the notion of policy-
based intention, but, also, his theory is traditionally considered as one of the main
philosophical references for modelling cognitive agents in MAS. As is well known,
Bratman admits that, in some cases, an action is intentionally performed even though
the agent did not specifically intend to perform it. On the other hand, according to him,
rational agents can be basically modelled as follows [7]:
• agents are goal-directed without being necessarily aware of their activity;
• intentions are used to choose partial plans for the realisation of a goal;
• not all consequences are intended but only some initial intentions and the goal
as a result of the plan; if some side-effects occur, they are never intended.
According to this view, side effects should be in principle excluded from the inten-
tional sphere of goal-directed agents. From the logical point of view, this idea makes
it necessary to avoid several variants of logical omniscience: omniscience arises when
the agent is required to know all the truths defined by her logic, or when the logic
that depicts the agent automatically includes all the logical truths of classical logic,
or, finally, if the agent knows all the logical consequences of the known propositions
[15]. In this perspective, the expected side-effects problem seems to depend on the in-
teractions between the reasoning mechanism for the propositional inferences and the
mechanism ruling the introduction and the behaviour of the modal operators represent-
ing mental states. A simple and rather unsatisfactory solution would be to consider
two completely unrelated consequence relations, one for the propositional part and the
second one for the modal operators. The consequence relation for a modal operator is
meant to give the condition under which one can prove a modal formula. For example
the pair Γ |∼X α , where X is a modal operator, means that if we can prove all the formu-
las in Γ then we can deduce Xα . In what follows we will develop a system for mental
states and motivational attitudes based on this idea. However, we will allow the conse-
quence relation for intentions and obligations to interact with the propositional module
and we will also consider possible interactions between the modal operators. To this
end we have to show that the expected side-effects phenomenon is not a drawback for
policy-based agents: such a kind of agents must accept the expected-side effects unless
they have some reasons to reject the consequences corresponding to them.
In effect, though our proposed theory does not entertain many of the properties
leading to logical omniscience, some aspects of the side-effects problem are accepted.
Consider
INTGoToDentist, GoToDentist⇒ Pain |∼ INTPain (1)
INTGoToRome, GoToRome⇒ GoToItaly |∼ INTGoToItaly (2)
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The first inference says that, if the agent intends to go to the dentist, and going to the
dentist will cause pain, then the agent intends to have pain. The second inference states
that, if the agent intends to go to Rome, and Rome is in Italy, then the agent intends to
go to Italy. Actually, whereas the first case is clearly unacceptable, the second should
be accepted by a rational agent. In this perspective the side-effects problem is similar
to the substitution of indiscernible in opaque contexts. An agent may have the intention
to visit Rome and not to visit Italy. But if the agent knows that Rome is the capital of
Italy then it would be irrational for the agent not to have the intention to go to Italy
given the intention to visit Rome.
Accordingly, some cases of the side-effects problem are not necessarily a weakness
of a theory. This holds in particular if we assume that our agents are aware of their ac-
tivities, which means that they know (or believe in) the policies regulating their own
deliberation. This implies that awareness is nothing but a form of epistemic introspec-
tion: accordingly, the example above can be reframed as follows:
INTGoToDentist, BEL(GoToDentist⇒ Pain) |∼ INTPain (3)
INTGoToRome, BEL(GoToRome⇒ GoToItaly) |∼ INTGoToItaly (4)
In our view, modelling rational agents corresponds to the following assumptions:
• agents are aware of their activities, of their policies;
• some cases of the side-effects problem can be accepted;
• if a case has to be rejected this means that some of its consequences should not
be intended;
• when some consequences are not intended, this only means that they are blocked
by conflicting attitudes or facts.
The theory an agent is equipped with can be understood as the specification of the
behaviour of the agent. If the agent is aware that B is an unavoidable/indisputable
consequence of A and the agent intends A, then B is a consequence of the agent’s
intentions and the agent must accept it as part of her intentions. Suppose we have that
“raising one’s hand at an auction counts as making a bid”. Thus if the agent (aware
of this policy) intends to raise her hand, then she intends to bid in the auction, and
her action will be understood as making a bid. In other words, in our system we will
try to balance and moderate some unpleasant aspects of the side-effects problem with
the equally important need for modelling rational agents. Of course, according to our
view, we may have that something is intended even if it is causally distant with respect
to the original derived intentions. But this is not necessarily a drawback if we conceive
agents as rational and, as such, being aware of the policies which are related with the
environment and with their interests: even a causally distant behaviour can be rationally
intended unless it is removed in the meantime from deliberation. But this case is indeed
considered within our analysis because we may have concrete contexts in which some
policy-based intentions, as soon as they are applicable, turn out to be overridden by
other policies: we may have reasons to argue that, if an agent intends A and believes
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that B is a consequence of A, this is not a reason for necessarily intending B; in fact,
the derivation of B as an intention may be blocked, in our view, by competing attitudes
or made non-applicable by concrete facts.
According to the previous discussion it should be clear that, though inspired by
Bratman’s [7] analysis, the notion of intention we study in this paper is slightly differ-
ent, as it focuses on the idea of intentionality. In Bratman’s view intentions are used to
choose partial plans for the realisation of a goal; in this way they have a close relation
to means-ends. In our view intentions should be related not only to means-ends but
also to the their consequences.
This concept of intention is particularly relevant in conjunction with deontic and
normative notions, for example if we want to say that an agent is legally or morally
responsible for A if the agent did A with the intention to do A. In other words, that an
agent can be qualified as responsible for a normative violation (i.e., to act in contrast
with some normative provisions) requires that agent’s behaviour is performed inten-
tionally (see the discussion in [7, 27]). Of course, we may identify different degrees
of responsibility by checking, for instance, whether the agent has a direct, or only an
indirect, control over the consequences of her actions. But, in the legal perspective,
in particular, responsibility is usually associated with some minimal form of intention-
ality: only in case of an agent acting completely unintentionally, the the law usually
excludes that the agent is responsible. In other words, we have the following options:
Th = {INTa, BEL(a⇒ b), OBL¬b}
responsible not responsible
Th |∼ INTb Th 6 |∼INTb
In one option the agent is not responsible, as we do not derive any conflicting intention
with respect to the prohibition to do b; in the other case, the agent is responsible, as she
intends to do b. On account of this logical analysis, since we have sometimes to accept
some side effects, the agent has to include in the set of her intentions not only her
intentions in Bratman’s sense but also some of their consequences. It is worth noting
that our intuition is compatible with von Wright’s [37] classical theory of normative
actions. Von Wright’s problem is to identify what should be the content of norms.
He argues that norms should deal with actions. Roughly, actions can be described
in terms of state transitions and as the sets of all changes of world that follow from
them. It is not our purpose discussing here von Wright’s theory of action. It should be
noted, however, that he considers the related problem of intentions. On the one hand,
von Wright is clear when he says that any action may have an arbitrary number of
consequences and not all of them are intended. On the other hand, he provides a very
broad concept of action, according to which all actions in norms, strictly speaking, are
intentional. If so, what are the boundaries of intentions to be considered when they
interplay with obligations?
Let us see how to recast Bratman’s Strategic Bomber scenario [7] in this perspec-
tive. The basic scenario runs as follows: Strategic Bomber intends to bomb a munition
plant of the enemy being aware that the resulting explosion will kill innocent children
in a nearby school. Bratman argues that Strategic Bomber does not have the intention
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to kill the children. Formally, Bratman’s scenario can be represented as follows: if
Th = {INTbomb, BEL(bomb⇒ kill), INTbomb⇒ INT¬kill, OBL¬kill}
then
Th 6 |∼INTkill
Let us expand the scenario by supposing that despite the bombing, Strategic Bomber
loses the war, and that there is a process for war crimes against him. Civil casualties are
a sad but almost unavoidable consequence of war, but usually the killing of civilians
does not constitute a war crime if there was no intention to kill. According to Bratman,
Strategic Bomber did not commit a war crime since he did not have such an intention
(see above). However, let us assume that Strategic Bomber did not do anything to
prevent or minimise civil casualties (let us say by a movement of troops that might
have resulted in an evacuation of the area surrounding the munition plant). In this
extended scenario the killing of children is brought about by a (successful) intentional
act of Strategic Bomber. Accordingly, he must be held responsible for the killing of
innocent civilians.
Formally, this means that the intention to minimise civil casualties is a condition for
not obtaining the intention to kill innocents and, conversely, intending not to minimise
causalties permits to derive the intention to kill. Hence, if
Th′ = {INTbomb, INT¬minimise, OBL¬kill, BEL(¬minimise⇒ kill), INTbomb,
INTbomb⇒ INT¬kill}
then
Th′ |∼ INTkill
Clearly, under this reading we assume that we can derive the intention to kill from the
fact that the agent intended not to minimise civil causalties. Accordingly, the agent is
responsible for the killing. Note that this can be captured only if we adopt defeasible
reasoning: Th′ would prima facie also imply INT¬kill, a conclusion which should be
blocked in this context. Given this interpretation of intentions, we will see in the rest of
this paper that some standard accounts of agent types, and of social agents in particular,
are not satisfactory.
3 BIO Agents in Defeasible Logic
3.1 Basics of Defeasible Logic
Defeasible Logic (DL) was originally proposed by Nute [29, 28] with a particular con-
cern about computational efficiency and developed over the years notably by [5, 3, 2].
DL is suitable for implementations [24], is flexible [2] (it has a constructively defined
and easy to use proof theory), and it is modular [3] (it can be easily extended to cover
different logical components: besides the current contribution, see, e.g., [11, 10]). In
addition, DL is efficient: it is possible to compute the complete set of consequences of
a given theory in linear time [23]. As we will see, this result also applies to the logical
framework presented in this paper.
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Knowledge in DL can be represented in two ways: facts and rules.
Facts are indisputable statements and are represented by predicates. We only use a
propositional language. Facts containing free variables are interpreted as the set of their
variable-free instances. For example, “the price of the spam filter is $50” is represented
by Price(SpamFilter,50).
A rule, on the other hand, describes the relationship between a set of literals
(premises) and a literal (conclusion), and we can specify how strong the relationship
is. As usual, rules allow us to derive new conclusions given a set of premises. As far as
the strength of rules is concerned we distinguish between strict rules, defeasible rules
and defeaters.
Strict rules, defeasible rules and defeaters are represented, respectively, by ex-
pressions of the form A1, . . . ,An → B, A1, . . . ,An ⇒ B and A1, . . . ,An ; B, where
{A1, . . . ,An} is a possibly empty set of prerequisites and B is the conclusion of the
rule3. We only consider rules that are essentially propositional. Rules containing free
variables are interpreted as the set of their ground instances.
Strict rules are rules in the classical sense: whenever the premises are indisputable
then so is the conclusion. Thus they can be used for definitional clauses. An example
of a strict rule is “A ‘Premium Customer’ is a customer who has spent $10,000 on
goods”:
TotalExpense(x, 10000)→ PremiumCustomer(x).
Defeasible rules are rules that can be defeated by contrary evidence. An example of
such a rule is “Premium Customer are entitled to a 5% discount”:
PremiumCustomer(x)⇒ Discount(x).
The idea is that if we know that someone is a Premium Customer, then we may con-
clude that she is entitled to a discount unless there is other evidence suggesting that she
may not be (for example if she buys a good in promotion).
Defeaters are a special kind of rules. They are used to prevent conclusions not to
support them. For example:
SpecialOrder(x),PremiumCustomer(x); ¬Surcharge(x).
This rule states that premium customers placing special orders might be exempt from
the special order surcharge. This rule can prevent the derivation of a “surcharge” con-
clusion. On the other hand it cannot be used to support a “not surcharge” conclusion.
DL is a “skeptical” non-monotonic logic, meaning that it does not support contra-
dictory conclusions. Instead DL seeks to resolve conflicts. In cases where there is some
support for concluding A but also support for concluding ¬A, DL does not conclude
either of them (thus the name “skeptical”). If the support for A has priority over the
support for ¬A then A is concluded.
As we have alluded to above, no conclusion can be drawn from conflicting rules in
DL unless these rules are prioritised. The superiority relation among rules is used to
3We will drop set notation for the antecedents of rules
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define priorities among rules, that is, where one rule may override the conclusion of
another rule. For example, given the defeasible rules
r : PremiumCustomer(x)⇒ Discount(x)
r′ : SpecialOrder(x)⇒¬Discount(x)
which contradict one another, no conclusive decision can be made about whether a
Premium Customer who has placed a special order is entitled to the 5% discount. But
if we introduce a superiority relation > with r′ > r, then we can indeed conclude that
special orders are not subject to discount.
Informally, conclusions can be drawn in DL according to the following intuition.
Let D be a theory in DL (i.e., a collection of facts, rules and a superiority relation over
the set of rules). A conclusion of D is a tagged literal and can have one of the following
four forms:
+∆q meaning that q is definitely provable in D (i.e., using only facts and strict rules).
−∆q meaning that we have proved that q is not definitely provable in D.
+∂q meaning that q is defeasibly provable in D.
−∂q meaning that we have proved that q is not defeasibly provable in D.
Strict derivations are obtained by forward chaining of strict rules, while a defeasible
conclusion p can be derived if there is a rule whose conclusion is p, whose prerequisites
(antecedent) have either already been proved or given in the case at hand (i.e., facts),
and any stronger rule whose conclusion is ¬p has prerequisites that fail to be derived.
In other words, a conclusion p is derivable when:
• p is a fact; or
• there is an applicable strict or defeasible rule for p, and either
– all the rules for ¬p are discarded (i.e., not applicable) or
– every applicable rule for ¬p is weaker than an applicable strict4 or defeasi-
ble rule for p.
In the next sections we will see how the basic machinery of DL can be extended to deal
with the multi-modal logic required to model BIO agents.
3.2 Modal Defeasible Logic
Our purpose is to account for policy-based motivations of BIO agents, which requires
to capture at least some basic facets of the modal notions of belief, intention, and
obligation.
Usually modal logics are extensions of classical propositional logic with some in-
tensional operators. Thus any modal logic should account for two components: (1) the
4Notice that a strict rule can be defeated only when its antecedent is defeasibly provable.
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underlying logical structure of the propositional base and (2) the logic behaviour of
the modal operators. Alas, as is well-known, classical propositional logic is not well
suited to deal with real life scenarios. The main reason is that the descriptions of real-
life cases are, very often, partial and somewhat unreliable. Our discussion in Section
2 is in line with this intuition as far as agents’ motivational attitudes are concerned.
Accordingly, in such circumstances classical propositional logic might produce coun-
terintuitive results insofar as it requires complete, consistent and reliable information.
Hence any modal logic based on classical propositional logic is doomed to suffer from
the same problems.
On the other hand the logic should specify how modalities can be introduced and
manipulated. Some common rules for modalities are, e.g.,
` ϕ
`2ϕ Necessitation
` ϕ ⊃ ψ
`2ϕ ⊃2ψ RM
Both dictates conditions to introduce modalities based purely on the derivability and
structure of the antecedent. These inference rules are related to the problem of logical
omniscience: if 2 corresponds either to INT, BEL, or OBL, they put unrealistic as-
sumptions on the cognitive capabilities of an agent. In effect, although some aspects
of the expected side-effects problem should be accepted in modelling rational agents,
rules such as Necessitation and RM are clearly too demanding: both in general permit
to derive that an agent believes or intends something, or that something is obligatory
for her, assuming that she knows all the truths defined by her logic, or that the logic that
depicts her behaviour automatically includes all the logical truths of classical logic, or
that she knows all the logical consequences of known propositions.
The point is thus avoid these difficulties by only admitting the side effects for which
no contrary reason can be advanced. Our strategy is twofold. First, we take a construc-
tive interpretation of 2: we have that if an agent can build a derivation of ϕ then she
can build a derivation of 2ϕ . We want to maintain this intuition, but also to replace
derivability in classical logic with a practical and feasible notion like derivability in
DL. Thus the intuition behind this work is that we are allowed to derive 2p if we can
prove p with the mode 2 in DL.
To extend DL with modal operators we have two options: 1) to use the same in-
ferential mechanism as basic DL and to represent explicitly the modal operators in the
conclusion of rules [31]; 2) introduce new types of rules for the modal operators to
differentiate between modal and factual rules.
For example the “deontic” statement “The Purchaser shall follow the Supplier price
lists” can be represented as
AdvertisedPrice(X ,Y )⇒ OBLpurchaserPay(X ,Y )
if we follow the first option and
AdvertisedPrice(X ,Y )⇒OBLpurchaser Pay(X ,Y )
according to the second option, where ⇒OBLpurchaser denotes a new type of defeasible
rule relative to the modal operator OBLpurchaser. In both cases the meaning of the rule is
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that given that the price of the item X advertised by the supplier is Y , then the purchaser
has the obligation to pay Y for item X .
The differences between the two approaches, besides the fact that in the first ap-
proach there is only one type of rules while the second accounts for factual and modal
rules, is that the first approach has to introduce an additional machinery for introducing
and reasoning with modal operators. Hence, explicitly representing the modal opera-
tors in the conclusion of rules does not follow the basic intuition we have suggested
above. In fact, in this case we would have to provide a definition of p-incompatible
literals (i.e., a set of literals that cannot be hold when p holds.) for every literal p. For
example we can have a modal logic where 2p and ¬p cannot be both true at the same
time. Moreover the first approach is less flexible than the second: in particular in some
cases it must account for rules to derive 3p from 2p; similarly conversions –which
permit to use a rule for a certain modality as it were for another modality (see infra)–
require additional operational rules in a theory, thus the second approach seems to offer
a more conceptual tool than the first one. It seems that the second approach can use
different proof conditions based on the modal rules to offer a more fine grained control
over the modal operators and it allows for interaction between modal operators.
If we label the arrows of the rules (i.e., agent’s policies) of our rule-based system by
the different modalities we want to deal with, then this solution leads to distinguishing
different modes through which the literals can be derived using rules. How such types
of derivation are related to the introduction of the corresponding modalised literals can
be expressed as follows: if X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}, then
Γ Γ⇒X ψ
Γ |∼Xψ MI
As we will see, we do make an exception when rules for belief are concerned since
we will state that X ∈ {INT,OBL}. The reason for this is that we assume that beliefs
are conceived of as the knowledge the agent has of the environment, and so they are
used by the agent to make inferences about how the world is: in this perspective, belief
conclusions correspond to factual knowledge and do not need to be modalised. But
besides this exception, which can be removed if required, schema MI captures the
basic logical behaviour of our modal rules.
However, if nothing is done besides labelling the rules of DL, what we have in
our hands is nothing but a simple treatment of modalities: what we obtain is that the
conditions for introducing modalities (and in particular intentions and obligations) col-
lapse into those for deriving literals in standard DL. Hence, the next step is to allow the
consequence relations to interact with the propositional module and with each other.
Indeed, we could in theory define sets of many interaction patterns, but what we need
for the purposes of our paper are only two interaction strategies: one that permits to
use rules for a modality X as they were for another modality Y (rule conversions), and
one that considers conflicts between rules (conflict-detection and conflict-resolution).
Rule Conversions The notion of rule conversion allows us to model peculiar interac-
tions between different modal operators. In general, notice that in many formalisms it
is possible to convert from one type of conclusion into a different one. Take for exam-
ple the right weakening rule of non-monotonic consequence relations (see, for example
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[22])
B `C A |∼B
A |∼C
which allows the combination of non-monotonic and classical consequences.
Suppose that a rule of a specific type is given and also suppose that all the literals in
the antecedent of a rule are provable in one and the same modality. If so, is it possible
to argue that the conclusion of the rule inherits the modality of the antecedent? To give
an example, suppose we have that ψ⇒BEL φ and that we derive ψ using a rule labelled
by INT. Can we conclude INTφ? If the answer is positive, on the basis of MI this can
be represented as follows:
Γ |∼ INTψ ψ ⇒BEL φ
Γ, INTψ |∼ INTφ Conversion
In many cases this is a reasonable conclusion to obtain. Indeed, this is the inference
pattern we discussed in Section 2: if an agent believes to visit Italy if she visits Rome,
and she has the intention to visit Rome, then it seems rational that she has the intention
to visit Italy. Thus, conversions are ways through which some rational side effects
can be derived. An additional example can help us illustrate the notion of conversion.
Consider the following formalisation of the Yale Shooting Problem.5
load live ammo,shoot⇒BEL kill
This rule encodes the knowledge of an agent that knows that loading the gun with live
ammunitions, and then shooting will kill her friend. This example clearly shows that
the qualification of the conclusions depends on the modalities relative to the individual
acts “load” and “shoot”. In particular, if we obtain that the agent intends to load and
to shoot the gun (INT(load), INT(shoot)), then, since she knows that the consequence
of these actions is the death of her friend, she intends to kill him. However, if shooting
was not intended, then we have prima facie to say that killing, too, was not intentional.
To define the admitted conversions we introduce a binary relation “Convert” over
the modalities of the language. When we write Convert(BEL, INT) this means that
a belief rule r can be used to derive an intention (of course, provided that all its an-
tecedents are derived as intentions): r can thus be converted into a rule for intention.
Notice that we do not impose any specific constraint on Convert. In particular, we
do not require Convert to be irreflexive. In fact, rule conversions can be viewed as
corresponding, in a multi-modal setting, to the following inference schema:
Xψ Y (ψ → φ)
Xφ
(5)
If we have Convert(X ,Y ) and X = Y , we do not obtain something necessarily odd. As
is well-known, in deontic logic, for example, this inference pattern corresponds to the
so-called deontic detachment:
OBLψ OBL(ψ → φ)
OBLφ
(6)
5Here we will ignore all temporal aspects and we will assume that the sequence of actions is done in the
correct order.
13
Although (6) is far from being uncontroversial, it seems that the same philosophical
reasons that lead to accept it may support, for example, the adoption of its counterpart
for intentions. Thus, even though we do not want in general to accept (5) when X =Y ,
we believe that this case cannot be excluded, and so, a fortiori, that Convert(X ,X) be
always rejected.
Conflicts As was mentioned in the previous sections, conflict-detection and conflict-
resolution play an important role in the current context. It is in fact crucial to establish
criteria for detecting and solving conflicts between the different components which
characterise the cognitive profiles of agent’s deliberation. In a multi-modal setting, we
can establish which modalities can be incompatible with each other, and, also, we can
impose various forms of consistency, such as the following:
Xφ →¬Y¬φ (7)
(Xφ ∧Y¬φ)→¬Z¬φ (8)
Criteria for conflict-detection and -resolution in DL can capture the rationale of
schemata such as (7) and (8). However, their precise definition makes it necessary to
take care of the peculiar approach adopted. In particular, various forms of consistency
between agents’ motivations require to define incompatibility relations between the
modalities by referring to rule types as well as to specific methods to solve conflicts
between the rules. Many complex conflict patterns can be identified [18, 10, 11]. For
the purpose of this paper, we introduce a binary and asymmetric relation Conflict over
the set of modalities that defines which types of rules are in conflict and which are the
stronger ones (the formal definition of Conflict is given in Section 3.4). Suppose, for
example, that we have
r : a⇒BEL q
s : b⇒OBL ¬q
t : c⇒INT q
If we only have Conflict(BEL,OBL), this means that rule r is in conflict with rule s
and that r is stronger than s: for this reason, if applicable, r will defeat s. Suppose now
to drop r. Nothing is said about the relation between obligations and intentions, and so
about rules s and t. This means that there is no incompatibility relation between INT
and OBL and we are free to derive both INTq and OBL¬q.
The relation Conflict is explicitly linked to that of agent type. Classically, agent
types are characterised by stating conflict resolution types in terms of orders of over-
ruling between rules [8, 18, 10, 11]. In this perspective, agent types are meaningful
within a non-monotonic setting and are nothing but general strategies to detect and
solve conflicts between the different components of the cognitive profiles of agent’s
deliberation. In [8] 24 possible types are identified while, in [11], based on a different
framework, 20 combinations are proposed. Typically, rational agents are assumed to
be at least realistic: a realistic agent, in fact, is such that rules for beliefs override all
other components, as beliefs correspond to agent’s account of how the environment is.
If the realistic condition is abandoned, we may have situations where intentions and
desires override beliefs, thus leading to various forms of wishful thinking. Given the
14
minimal assumption that a rational agent should be realistic, we may further constrain
agent’s deliberation in order not to violate obligations: a social agent type requires that
obligations are stronger than the other motivational components with the exception of
beliefs. Other agent types can be specified, for which see Section 4.
3.3 A Summary of Our Intuitions
Before providing a detailed presentation of the logical system for BIO agents, let us
briefly summarise the logical intuitions previously presented and check them against
the conceptual discussion we have developed in Section 2.
The main intuitions characterising our logical approach are the following:
1. The rules aim to capture policy-based motivations. For example, the rule
¬SunShining⇒BEL Raining says that, if the sun is not shining, then the agent
believes that it is raining; the rule SunShining⇒INT Jogging says that the agent
intends to do jogging if the sun is shining; the rule Order⇒OBL Pay says that, if
the agent sends a purchase order, then she will be obliged to pay.
2. Rules for intention and obligation are meant to introduce modalities: for exam-
ple, if we have a⇒INT b and we derive a, then we obtain INTb.
3. Rules labelled with BEL are an exception to the intuition under point 2 above. In
the perspective of a single agent, agent’s beliefs describe how things effectively
stand in the world. Hence, they are taken as true beliefs, and so we do not need
to derive in this case modalised literals. For instance, if we have a⇒BEL b and
derive a, then we simply get b.
4. For the sake of simplicity, modal literals can only occur in the antecedent of
rules. This is in line with our idea that the applicability of rules labelled with
a modality X is the condition for deriving literals modalised with X . In other
words, we do not admit rules such as a⇒OBL INTb.
5. We introduce conversions, which allow to derive modalised literals using rules
labelled with different modalities. For example, if we have a⇒BEL b, derive
INTa, and Convert(BEL, INT) holds, then we obtain INTb.
6. We devise methods (in particular, the relation Conflict) for detecting and solving
conflicts between rules. This is in the spirit of standard DL, but here conflict
resolution has a peculiar role, given the specific defeasible nature of policy-based
motivations and the possibility of identifying different agent types.
It is worth noting that INT and OBL are not simple labels: they are modalities. In
fact, in contrast with BEL, we model INT and OBL as non-reflexive modalities6. In
addition, conversions provide complex interaction patterns between modalities which
regulate various form of modal detachment.
6As is well-known, in a non-reflexive modal logic a does not follow from Xa, where X is a modal operator.
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Secondly, we do not admit iterated modalities. Clearly, this is a simplification
aimed at keeping the system manageable, but it does not pose severe limits for our pur-
poses7. Since literals modalised with BEL never occur, we only fail to treat structures
such as INT(INTa), OBL(OBLa), OBL(INTa), and INT(OBLa). While iterations of
the same modality have a little significance, the last two structures express cases which
are not needed for our discussion: INT(OBLa) makes sense when the agent is a sort
of law-giver; OBL(INTa) establishes the obligation to intend, which is something that
normative systems usually do not state (especially in the law).
How do these intuitions match with the conceptual points discussed in Section 2?
Two questions are worthy of comment here: the fact that an agent is assumed to be
aware of her policies, and the side-effect problem.
nAs regards the first question, awareness can be modelled as a kind of epistemic
introspection. In other words, for any policy such as a⇒ b, the agent is aware of it if
we have BEL(a⇒ b). However, rules are implictly assumed to be believed, exactly as
assume that non-modal literals derived via belief rules are also believed (remember that
we take beliefs as true beliefs). Making explicit modalities for belief, in our framework,
would be strictly necessary only if we considered more than one agent: only in this
case, we would need to mark the fact that some a is believed by one or another agent.
On the other hand, it is worth noting that a reasoning schema such as
INTa BEL(a⇒ b)
INTb
(9)
is captured in our framework by stating that, if we have a⇒BEL b, derive INTa and
Convert(BEL, INT) holds, then we obtain INTb.
This reconstruction of (9) allows us to account for the inclusion of some side ef-
fects. Let us provide a possible formalisation of the revised Strategic Bomber scenario
we discussed in Section 2.1:
Th′ = {INTbomb, INT¬minimise, OBL¬kill,
INTbomb⇒INT ¬kill),
¬minimise⇒BEL kill}
By default it is assumed that the intention to bomb does not imply the intention to kill
innocents. But, if we assume that Convert(BEL, INT) holds and the agent is realistic
(beliefs override all other factors), since we derive INT¬minimise (it is a fact), through
the belief rule in Th′ we obtain INTkill. In other words, under this interpretation, the
side effect kill is intended.
3.4 The Language of Modal Defeasible Logic
The inference process derives factual knowledge (through belief rules), intentions and
obligations based on existing facts, intentions and obligations. Thus, rules allow for the
7However, notice that it does not seem hard to extend the framework of Sections 3.4 and 3.5 to cover
nested modalities. It is sufficient to modify some language definitions, revise the definition of conflict, and
make a few changes in the proof conditions. For a treatment in DL of nested modalities, even though applied
to the logic of agency, see [17].
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derivation of new motivational factors of an agent. As was mentioned, we divide the
rules into rules for beliefs, intentions, and obligations. Provability for beliefs does not
generate modalised literals, since in our view beliefs concern the knowledge an agent
has about the world and corresponds to the basic inference mechanism of the agent.
A defeasible agent theory consists of a set of facts or indisputable statements, three
sets of rules for beliefs, intentions, and obligations, a set of conversions saying when a
rule of one type can be used also as another type, a set of conflict relations saying when
two rule types can be in conflict and which rule type prevails, and a superiority relation
> among rules saying when a single rule may override the conclusion of another rule.
For X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}, we have that φ1, . . . ,φn →X ψ is a strict rule such that
whenever the premises φ1, . . . ,φn are indisputable so is the conclusionψ . φ1, . . . ,φn⇒X
ψ is a defeasible rule that can be defeated by contrary evidence. φ1, . . . ,φn ;X ψ is
a defeater that is used to defeat some defeasible rules by producing evidence to the
contrary. It is worth noting that modalised literals can occur only in the antecedent of
rules: the reason of this is that the rules are used to derive modalised conclusions while
we do not conceptually need to iterate modalities. This limitation makes the system
more manageable.
DEFINITION 1 (Language). Let PROP be a set of propositional atoms, MOD =
{BEL, INT,OBL} be the set of modal operators, and Lab be a set of labels. The sets
below are the smallest sets closed under the following rules:
Literals
Lit = PROP∪{¬p|p ∈ PROP}
If q is a literal, ∼q denotes the complementary literal (if q is a positive literal p
then ∼q is ¬p; and if q is ¬p, then ∼q is p);
Modal literals
ModLit = {Xl,¬Xl|l ∈ Lit,X ∈ {INT,OBL}};
Rules Rule = Rules∪Ruled ∪Ruledft, where for X ∈MOD
Rules = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn→X ψ|
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ Lit∪ModLit,ψ ∈ Lit}
Ruled = {r : φ1, . . . ,φn⇒X ψ|
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ Lit∪ModLit,ψ ∈ Lit}
Ruledft = {r : φ ;X ψ|
r ∈ Lab,A(r)⊆ Lit∪ModLit,ψ ∈ Lit}
We use some obvious abbreviations, such as superscript for mental attitude, sub-
script for type of rule, and Rule[φ ] for rules whose consequent is φ , for example:
RuleBEL = {r : φ1, . . . ,φnBEL ψ|
(r : φ1, . . . ,φnBEL ψ) ∈ Rule, ∈ {→,⇒,;}}
Rules[ψ] = {φ1, . . . ,φn→X ψ|
{φ1, . . . ,φn} ⊆ Lit∪ModLit,ψ ∈ Lit,X ∈MOD}
We use A(r) to denote the set {φ1, . . . ,φn} of antecedents of the rule r, and C(r)
to denote the consequent ψ of the rule r.
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DEFINITION 2 (Conversion and Conflict Relations). The conversion relation Convert
is defined as follows:
Convert⊆MOD×MOD
The conflict relation Conflict⊆MOD×MOD is such that
∀X ,Y ∈MOD, Conflict(X ,Y )⇒¬(Conflict(Y,X))(asymmetry)
DEFINITION 3 (Defeasible Agent Theory). A defeasible agent theory is a structure
D = (F,RBEL,RINT,ROBL,>,C ,V )
where
• F ⊆ Lit∪ModLit is a finite set of facts;
• RBEL ⊆ RuleBEL, RINT ⊆ RuleINT, ROBL ⊆ RuleOBL are three finite sets of rules
such that each rule has a unique label;
• The superiority relation > is such that >=>sm ∪>Conflict, where >sm⊆ RX ×RX
such that if r > s, then if r ∈ RuleX [p] then s ∈ RuleX [∼p] and > is acyclic; and
>Conflict is such that
∀r ∈ RuleX [p],∀s ∈ RuleY [∼p], if Conflict(X ,Y ), then r >Conflict s
• C ⊆ {Convert(X ,Y )|X ,Y ∈MOD} is a set of conversions;
• V ⊆ {Conflict(X ,Y )|X ,Y ∈MOD} is a set of conflict relations.
The construction of the superiority relation combines two components: the first
>sm considers pairs of rules of the same mode. This component is usually given by the
designer of the theory and capture the meaning of the single rules, and thus encodes
the domain knowledge of the designer of the theory. The second component, >Conflict
is obtained from the rules in a theory and depends on the meaning of the modalities.
The following running example illustrates the defeasible agent theory.
EXAMPLE 1. (RUNNING EXAMPLE). Frodo, our Tolkienian agent, is entrusted by
Elrond to be the bearer of the ring of power, a ring forged by the dark lord Sauron.
Frodo has the task to bring the ring to Mordor, the realm of Sauron, and to destroy it
by throwing it into the fires of Mount Doom. However, Frodo loves the place where he
was born, the Shire, and intends to go there.
F = {INTGoToShire, EntrustedByElrond}
R = {r1 : EntrustedByElrond⇒BEL RingBearer
r2 : RingBearer⇒OBL DestroyRing
r3 : INTGoToShire⇒INT ¬GoToMordor
r4 : ¬GoToMordor⇒BEL ¬DestroyRing}
>= {r4 > r2}
C = {Convert(BEL, INT)}
V = {Conflict(BEL,OBL)}
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3.5 Inferences with BIO Agents
Proofs are sequences of literals and modal literals together with so-called proof tags
+∆, −∆, +∂ and −∂ . Given a defeasible agent theory D, +∆X q means that literal q is
provable in D using only facts and strict rules for modality X , −∆X q means that it has
been proved in D that q is not definitely provable in D, +∂X q means that q is defeasibly
provable in D, and −∂X q means that it has been proved in D that q is not defeasibly
provable in D.
DEFINITION 4. Given an agent theory D, a proof in D is a linear derivation, i.e, a
sequence of labelled formulas of the type +∆X q, −∆X q, +∂X q and −∂X q, where the
proof conditions defined in the rest of this section hold.
We start with some terminology. As was explained, the following definition states
the special status of belief rules, and that the introduction of a modal operator cor-
responds to being able to derive the associated literal using the rules for the modal
operator.
DEFINITION 5. Let # ∈ {∆,∂}, and P = (P(1), . . . ,P(n)) be a proof in D. A (modal)
literal q is #-provable in P if there is a line P(m) of P such that either
1. q is a literal and P(m) = +#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) = +#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) =−#X p.
A literal q is #-rejected in P if there is a line P(m) of P such that
1. q is a literal and P(m) =−#BELq or
2. q is a modal literal X p and P(m) =−#X p or
3. q is a modal literal ¬X p and P(m) = +#X p.
The definition of ∆X describes just forward chaining of strict rules:
+∆X : If P(n+1) = +∆X q then
(1) q ∈ F if X = BEL or Xq ∈ F or
(2) ∃r ∈ RXs [q] : ∀a ∈ A(r) a is ∆-provable or
(3) ∃r ∈ RYs [q] : Convert(Y,X) ∈ C , ∀a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-provable.
−∆X : If P(n+1) =−∆X q then
(1) q /∈ F if X = BEL and Xq /∈ F and
(2) ∀r ∈ RXs [q] ∃a ∈ A(r) : a is ∆-rejected and
(3) ∀r ∈ RYs [q] : if Convert(Y,X) ∈ C then ∃a ∈ A(r) Xa is ∆-rejected.
For a literal q to be definitely provable with the mode X we need to find a strict rule for
X with head q, whose antecedents have all been definitely proved previously. And to
establish that q cannot be definitely proven we must establish that for every strict rule
with head q there is at least one antecedent which has been shown to be non-provable.
Condition (3) says that a rule for Y can be used as a rule for a different modal operator
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X in case all literals in the body of the rule are modalised with the modal operator we
want to prove. For example, given the rule p,q→BEL s, we can derive +∆INTs if we
have +∆INT p, +∆INTq, and the conversion Convert(BEL, INT) holds in the theory.
Conditions for ∂X are more complicated. We define when a rule is applicable or
discarded. A rule for a belief is applicable if all the literals in the antecedent of the rule
are provable with the appropriate modalities, while the rule is discarded if at least one
of the literals in the antecedent is not provable. As before, for the other types of rules
we have to take conversions into account. We have thus to determine conditions under
which a rule for Y can be used to directly derive a literal q modalised by X . Roughly,
the condition is that all the antecedents a of the rule are such that +∂X a.
DEFINITION 6. Given a derivation P, P(1..n) denotes the initial part of the derivation
of length n. Let X ,Y,Z ∈MOD.
• A rule r ∈ Rsd is applicable in the proof condition for ±∂X iff
1. r ∈ RX and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) and
∀Za ∈ A(r), +∂Za ∈ P(1..n), or
2. r ∈ RY , Convert(Y,X) ∈ C , and ∀a ∈ A(r), +∂X a ∈ P(1..n).
• A rule r is discarded in the condition for ±∂X iff
1. r ∈ RX and ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) or ∃Za ∈ A(r) such that
−∂Za ∈ P(1..n); or
2. r ∈ RY and, if Convert(Y,X), then ∃a ∈ A(r) such that −∂X a ∈ P(1..n), or
3. r ∈ RZ and either ¬Convert(Z,X) or ¬Conflict(Z,X).
EXAMPLE 2. The rule a, INTb⇒BEL c is applicable if we can prove both +∂BELa and
+∂INTb.
EXAMPLE 3. If we have a type of agent that allows a deontic rule to be converted into a
rule for intention, Convert(OBL, INT), then the definition of applicable in the condition
for ±∂INT is as follows: a rule r ∈ Rsd [q] is applicable iff (1) r ∈ RINT and ∀a ∈ A(r),
+∂BELa ∈ P(1..n) and ∀Xa ∈ A(r), +∂X a ∈ P(1..n), (2) or r ∈ ROBL and ∀a ∈ A(r),
+∂INTa ∈ P(1..n). In this second case, for example, given the rule p,q⇒OBL s, we can
derive +∂INTs if we have +∂INT p and +∂INTq.
As a corollary of the definition of applicability, we can establish when a literal is
supported (see Section 5.2 for the use of this notion):
DEFINITION 7. Given a theory D, a literal l is supported in D iff there exists a rule
r ∈ R[l] such that r is applicable, otherwise l is not supported. For X ∈MOD we use
+ΣX l and −ΣX l to indicate that l is supported / not supported by rules for X.
We are now ready to provide proof conditions for ±∂X :
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+∂X : If P(n+1) = +∂X q then
(1)+∆X q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2) (2.1) −∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) and
(2.2) ∃r ∈ Rsd [q] such that r is applicable, and
(2.3) ∀s ∈ R[∼q] either s is discarded, or
(2.3.1) ∃t ∈ R[q] such that t is applicable and t > s, and either
t,s ∈ RZ , or Convert(Y,X) and t ∈ RY
−∂X : If P(n+1) =−∂X q then
(1) −∆X q ∈ P(1..n) and either
(2.1) +∆X∼q ∈ P(1..n) or
(2.2) ∀r ∈ Rsd [q], either r is discarded, or
(2.3) ∃s ∈ R[∼q], such that s is applicable, and
(2.3.1) ∀t ∈ R[q] either t is discarded, or t 6> s, or
t ∈ RZ ,s ∈ RZ′ , Z 6= Z′ and, if t ∈ RY then ¬Convert(Y,X).
To show that q is defeasibly provable we have two choices: (1) We show that q is
already definitely provable; or (2) we need to argue using the defeasible part of a theory
D. For this second case, three (sub)conditions must be satisfied. First, we need to
consider possible reasoning chains in support of∼q, and show that∼q is not definitely
provable (2.1). Second, we require that there must be a strict or defeasible rule for q
which can be applied (2.2). Third, we must consider the set of all rules which are not
known to be inapplicable and which permit to get ∼q (2.3). Essentially, each such a
rule s attacks the conclusion q. For q to be provable, s must be counterattacked by a
rule t for q with the following properties: (i) t must be applicable, and (ii) t must be
stronger than s. Thus each attack on the conclusion q must be counterattacked by a
stronger rule. In other words, r and the rules t form a team (for q) that defeats the
rules s. However, since we can have rules for different modes, we have to ensure we
have the appropriate relationships among the rules. Thus clause (2.3.1) prescribes that
either the rule that attacks the conclusion we want to prove (s) and the rule used to
counterattack it (i.e., t) have the same mode (i.e., s, t ∈ RZ), or that t can be used to
produce a conclusion of the mode we want to prove (i.e., t ∈ RY and Convert(Y,X)).
−∂X q is defined in an analogous manner.
EXAMPLE 4. (RUNNING EXAMPLE; CONTINUED). Below is the set C of all conclu-
sions we get using the rules in R:
C = {RingBearer, INT¬GoToMordor, INT¬DestroyRing}
As facts, we know that Frodo has the primitive intention to go to the Shire and that
he has been entrusted by Elrond. These facts make applicable rules r3 and r1, which
permit to derive that Frodo is the ring bearer and that he has the intention not to go
to Mordor. At this point we have a conflict, as we have Conflict(BEL,OBL) and
Convert(BEL, INT). In effect, given the conversion, r4 permits to derive that Frodo
has the intention not to destroy the ring while rule r2 should lead to the obligation to
destroy it. However, r4 is stronger than r2 and so we only get +∂INT¬DestroyRing.
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4 Agent Types
Classically, agent types are characterized by stating conflict resolution types in terms of
orders of overruling between rules [8, 18]. For example, an agent is realistic when rules
for beliefs override all other components; she is social when obligations are stronger
than the other motivational components with the exception of beliefs, etc.
As suggested in [10, 11], agent types can be characterised in DL as follows:
DEFINITION 8 (Agent Type (1)). An agent type is defined by a set of pairs (X ,Y ),
X ,Y ∈ {BEL,OBL, INT}, such that for every r and r′ such that r ∈ RX [q] and r′ ∈
RY [∼q], we have that r > r′.
For example, while realistic agents are such that X = BEL and Y ∈ {INT,OBL},
social agents are such that X = OBL and Y = INT. It is clear that the notion of agent
type is defined in terms of the relation Conflict we have previously introduced.
Let us see the agent types that can be identified in the framework we have defined
so far. Table 1 shows all possible cases and, for each kind of rule, indicates all attacks
on it. It should be read as follows. Each of the three main columns identifies a possible
kind of conflict between two types X ,Y of applicable rules that would permit to infer
the literals p and ∼p labelled by X and Y respectively. The first row from the top in
the three main columns specifies the case where both literals are derived (i.e., there is
no conflict, which indeed corresponds to the case where the modalities involved are
not in Conflict); the second and third rows from top identify the cases where we have
a conflict and one rule prevails over the other. The third sub-column in each main
column defines the agent type for which each conflict-detection and -resolution policy
is appropriate. (To save space, in Table 1 “indep.” abbreviates “independent”, “wish.
th.” “wishful thinking”, and “real.” “realistic”.)
⇒OBL p /⇒INT ∼p ⇒OBL p /⇒BEL ∼p ⇒INT p /⇒BEL ∼p
+∂OBL p +∂INT∼p indep. +∂OBL p +∂BEL∼p wish. th. +∂INT p +∂BEL∼p wish. th.
+∂OBL p −∂INT∼p social +∂OBL p −∂BEL∼p wish. th. +∂INT p −∂BEL p wish. th.
−∂OBL p +∂INT∼p deviant −∂OBL p +∂BEL∼p real. −∂INT p +∂BEL∼p real.
Table 1: Conflict: Agent Types
Independent agents are free to adopt intentions for p in presence of derivations for
OBL∼p. This is possible in our framework when we have that ¬Conflict(OBL, INT)
and ¬Conflict(INT,OBL): this means that the system admits both conclusions, as they
are not in conflict. As expected, for social agents obligations override intentions and
so Conflict(OBL, INT); the opposite case is when an agent is deviant and her inten-
tions override the obligations, Conflict(INT,OBL). Where beliefs are defeated either
by obligations or by intentions we have classical examples of wishful thinking. Notice
that in Table 1 also the cases +∂OBL p/+ ∂BEL∼p and +∂INT p/+ ∂BEL∼p have been
classified as wishful thinking, given the basic nature of beliefs we adopted in our frame-
work. However, we are aware that this reading is debatable: in effect, if we can derive
both conclusions, this means that there is no real conflict. Last, it is worth noting that
we do not consider here the case where −∂X p/− ∂Y∼p: here we would have that X
and Y are incompatible, but that it is not possible to establish what rule is the strongest
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Convert(BEL,OBL) c-realistic Convert(INT,OBL) c-deviant
Convert(BEL, INT) c-realistic Convert(OBL,BEL) NO
Convert(OBL, INT) c-social Convert(INT,BEL) NO
Table 2: Conversions
one, thus leading to a mutual defeating of the rules involved. This case –which is dis-
cussed in [18, 10, 11] and permits to identify other agent types– is excluded here, as
the relation Conflict both identifies conflicts and solves them by establishing what rule
type must prevail.
It is possible to integrate the above classifications by referring to the notion of con-
version. Conversions do not have a direct relation with conflict resolution because
they simply affect the condition of applicability of rules. However, they indeed con-
tribute to define the cognitive profile of agents because they allow to obtain conclusions
modalised by a certain X through the application of rules which are not modalised by
X . Table 2 shows the conversions and specify new agent types with respect to which
each conversion seems to be appropriate.
A preliminary remark before commenting Table 2. We do not consider here con-
versions Convert(X ,Y ) where X = Y . In fact, even though they can be admitted,
they do not seem to characterise a specific cognitive profile for the agents. Consider
Convert(BEL,OBL) and Convert(BEL, INT). Both seem appropriate for some types
of realistic agent. Indeed, for a realistic agent beliefs correspond to her basic reasoning
mechanism. Accordingly, if we have
r : ¬open umbrella⇒BEL wet
+∂INT¬open umbrella +∂OBL¬open umbrella
it is reasonable to derive both that the agent has the intention to be wet, and that it is
obligatory for her to be wet.
Other conversions look more appropriate for other agent types. For example, we
may have agent types for which Convert(OBL, INT) holds. This means that from
r : kill⇒OBL kill gently +∂INTkill
we can derive that the agent has the intention to kill gently. But this derivation is
conceptually meaningful only if we assume a kind of norm regimentation, by which
we impose that all agents intend what is prescribed by deontic rules.
The peculiarity of Convert(INT,OBL) is that the simple fact that something is de-
rived as obligatory can permit to obtain through a rule for intention that something else
is obligatory as well. Consider this case:
r : help needy people⇒INT save money +∂OBLhelp needy people
If Convert(INT,OBL) holds, then we can derive that it is obligatory for the agent to
save money: an intention supports the derivation of an obligation. In other papers
[18], this case has been classified as an example of an agent legislator. Here, we pre-
fer to consider it as a case of a deviant agent [11], due to its structural similarity to
Conflict(INT,OBL).
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Finally, notice that the conversions Convert(OBL,BEL) and Convert(INT,BEL),
which are marked in the table by a “NO”, seem meaningless. They say that a rule for
obligation and for intention may respectively be used to derive a belief. This sounds
odd, at least adopting the interpretation of beliefs of this paper. In fact, since the belief
modality captures the basic knowledge the agent has about the environment, it is treated
as its logic were reflexive (namely, that BELψ→ ψ holds). Consider, for example, the
following:
r : help needy people⇒INT save money +∂BELhelp needy people
If Convert(INT,BEL) holds, then we obtain that the agent in fact saves money,
which is odd: beliefs, according to our interpretation should be independent from
agent’s deliberation, even though they are used to derive motivational attitudes such
as intentions and obligations. In addition, adopting both Convert(OBL,BEL) and
Convert(INT,BEL) would determine a collapse of our logic, as we could dispense
with explicit modalities in the antecedent of rules.
Since our logic system is characterised by Conflict as well as by Convert, and con-
versions indeed contribute to define the cognitive profile of an agent, it seems that an
agent type should take both parameters into account:
DEFINITION 9 (Agent Type (2)). An agent type is defined by a pair (Γ,∆), where
Γ⊆ {Conflict(X ,Y )|X ,Y ∈MOD} and ∆⊆ {Convert(Z,W )|Z,W ∈MOD}.
It is easy to see that the notion of agent type of Definition 8 (proposed in [10, 11])
is captured by Definition 9.
This completes our picture of the notion of agent types. However, a serious diffi-
culty is around the corner when we focus on the notion of agent type based on defining
criteria for conflict-detection and -resolution. Are we sure that this view is sufficient,
given the account of policy-based attitudes we previously discussed? In the reminder
we will consider only the interaction between intentions and obligations, event though
similar remarks can be easily extended to all other agent types presented in Table 1.
But, even confining the problem to these components, the question at stake is: How
to deal with social agents? The simplest solution is the classical one, corresponding
to adopting schema (7) and that we have adopted so far: when we have two rules, one
leading to INTφ and the other to OBL∼φ , the former is blocked. As we shall see, this
strategy is not enough.
5 Social Agents
5.1 The Problem
The idea of social agent based on the intuition of Definition 8–which is also adopted
in [8]– does not guarantee that agent’s deliberation is oriented to fully complying with
obligations. The same holds when Definition 9 is used. In effect, to our view a social
agent can be defined by the following pair
({Conflict(BEL, INT),Conflict(BEL,OBL),Conflict(OBL, INT)},
{Convert(BEL,OBL),Convert(BEL, INT)})
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according to which the agent is realistic (beliefs override the other components, and
the appropriate conversions hold) and obligations prevail over conflicting intentions.
In both cases, the drawback is mainly due to the introduction of conversions. Since
conversions allow to obtain conclusions modalised by a certain X through the applica-
tion of rules which are not modalised by X , they are fundamental in order to capture the
fact that some side-effects should be accepted insofar as they are consequences of poli-
cies of which the agent is aware. Moreover, some conversions seem useful to integrate
the basic idea of social agency.
It is clear that our system admits three different types of intentions and obligations.
First, we have primitive intentions and obligations when these are facts of the theory.
But we can also have what we may call primary and secondary intentions and obliga-
tions, depending on whether we accept at least basic conversions via belief rules.
Let us consider Example 1. INTGoToShire is a primitive intention. On the other
hand, OBLDestroyRing –if it were derived from rule r2– and INT¬GoToMordor are
primary obligations and intentions as they would be obtained without the use of con-
versions (see Example 4). Finally, INT¬DestroyRing is a secondary intention be-
cause it is obtained from the rule r4 : ¬GoToMordor ⇒BEL ¬DestroyRing and from
+∂INT¬GoToMordor (again, see Example 4). It should be noted that OBLDestroyRing
cannot be derived because r4 > r2, but this just amounts to assuming that the agent is
realistic: r4 is a belief rule whereas r2 is a deontic rule. In other words, when we have
in general that
a⇒OBL q b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂BELa +∂INTb
we are doomed to have social agents who cannot be truly social since some of their
(primitive) intentions lead to behaviours against what would be otherwise obligatory
for the agents. However, this issue is not a matter of a direct conflict between rules
for intentions and obligations. Thus, to deal with norm-complying agents in these
scenarios and to restore their sociality we are required to change the notion of agent
type. We cannot anymore define it in terms of an order of overruling between rules, but
we have to focus on how the conflicting literals are derived during the proof. Indeed,
this is feasible, but has a high computational cost, and even then we cannot guarantee
the sociality of an agent.
5.2 The Cost of Social Agents
In this section we investigate the complexity of the defeasible logic for BIO agents
where we assume the conversions Convert(BEL,OBL) and Convert(BEL, INT) and
then we turn our attention to the complexity of social agents. We first introduce some
notions to make precise the definition of the issues at hand.
DEFINITION 10. Let # be one of the proof tags. Given a theory D, D ` ±#p iff there is
a derivation P in D such that for some n P(n) =±#p.
DEFINITION 11. Given a theory D, the universe of D (UD) is the set of all the atoms
occurring in D; the extension of D (ED), is defined as follows:
ED = (∆+,∆−,∂+,∂−)
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where for X ∈ {BEL, INT,OBL}
∆+ = {Xl : D `+∆X l};
∆− = {Xl : D ` −∆X l};
∂+ = {Xl : D `+∂X l};
∂− = {Xl : D ` −∂X l}.
Two theories D and D′ are equivalent if and only if they have the same extension,
namely D≡ D′ iff ED = ED′ .
We now prove the main theorem about the complexity of our defeasible logic. We
show that the logic has linear complexity if we compute the whole set of conclusions,
i.e., the extension, of a given theory.
THEOREM 1. For every theory D, ED can be computed in time linear to the size of the
theory, i.e., O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
PROOF. The proof is based on a modification of the algorithm given by Maher [23] to
show that propositional defeasible logic has linear complexity.
The main idea of the proof is to build appropriate data structure to implement a
series of transformations reducing the complexity of the rules, and where each literal
and modal literal is examined only once. The focal point of the transformations is
based on the following properties:
• Let D `+∂ p then
D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn⇒ q}.
• Let D ` −∂ p then D∪{r : p1, . . . , pn, p⇒ q} ≡ D.
The properties allow us (1) to remove already proved literals from the body of rules
and (2) to remove rules which have been discarded.
The algorithm has three phases. (1) A pre-processing phase where we use similar
transformations to those given in [3] to transform a theory into an equivalent theory
without superiority relation and defeaters; the transformation is linear. We will propose
two linear transformations, one to empty the superiority relation and one to remove
defeaters. We will show that these transformations are correct, that is, they produce the
same sets of conclusions in the language of the theory they transform (Theorem 2 and
Theorem 3). (2) A rule loader that parses the theory obtained in the first phase and
generates the data structure that encodes the theory. (3) The inference engine applies
transformations to the data structure, where at every step it reduces the complexity of
the data structure.
(1) Transformations Theory transformations are an important tools to study prop-
erties of defeasibly logic. In [3] we extensively used transformations to show under
which conditions it is possible to simplify the presentation of basic defeasible logic
by dispensing defeaters and the superiority relation. In what follows we are going to
give transformations that allow us to remove defeaters and the superiority relation from
modal defeasible theories for BIO agents.
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DEFINITION 12. Let # be one of the proof tags. Two modal defeasible theories D1 and
D2 are equivalent (written D1 ≡D2) iff ∀p,D1 ` #p iff D2 ` #p, i.e., they have the same
consequences. Similarly D1 ≡Σ D2 means that D1 and D2 have the same consequences
in the language Σ.
DEFINITION 13. A transformation is a mapping from modal defeasible theories to
modal defeasible theories. A transformation T is correct iff for all modal defeasible
theories D, D≡Σ T (D) where Σ is the language of D.
DEFINITION 14. Let A = {l1, . . . , ln} ⊆ Lit and X ∈MOD, then XA = {Xli : li ∈ A}.
DEFINITION 15. Let D = (F,R,>) be a defeasible theory such that Rd f t = /0. Let Σ be
the language of D. Define elimsup(D) = (F,R′, /0), where
R′ = {¬in f (r)⇒BEL in f (s) : (r,s) ∈>}
⋃
r∈R
elimsup(r)
and
elimsup(r) = {A(r) ↪→BEL ¬in f (r),¬in f (r) ↪→X C(r) : A(r) ↪→X C(r) ∈ Rsd}
For each rule r ∈ R, in f (r) is a new atom, i.e., they do not appear in Σ. Furthermore
all new atoms generated are distinct.
THEOREM 2. The transformation elimsup is correct.
PROOF. The proof by induction on the length of derivations is similar to that given in
[3]. Here we give in full the case of strict derivations and we outline the main part of
the case of defeasible derivations.
Case if D `+∆X p then elimsup(D) `+∆X p. For a proof of length 1 of +∆X p, i.e.,
P(1) = +∆X p, then we have two cases: (1) X p ∈ F , (2) ∃r ∈ RXs [p],A(r) = /0. The first
case is trivial since F is the same in D and elimsup(D). For (2) we have that elimsup(D)
contains the rules ra :→BEL ¬in f (r), and rc :¬in f (r)→ p. ra is applicable, so we have
+∆BEL¬in f (r), then this makes rc applicable and then we have elimsup(D) `+∆X p.
For the inductive step, we assume as usual that the property holds for proofs whose
length is up to n, and than we consider P(n+ 1) = +∆X p. Beside the cases for the
inductive base, we have two additional cases to consider here: (a) ∃r ∈ RXs [p],∀a ∈
A(r),+∆Y a ∈ P(1..n); (b) Convert(X ,Y ) and ∃s ∈ RYs ,+∆X a ∈ P(1..n).
For (a) by inductive hypothesis, ∀a ∈ A(r), elimsup(D) ` +∆a, thus the rule ra :
A(r)→BEL ¬in f (r) is applicable, thus elimsup(D) `+∆BEL¬in f (r), which makes rule
rc : ¬in f (r)→X p applicable as well, and we can conclude elimsup(D) `+∆X p.
For (b) by inductive hypothesis ∀a ∈ A(r), elimsup(D) ` +∆X a, thus we can use
the rule sa : A(r)→BEL ¬in f (s) to derive +∆X¬in f (s). Since we have Convert(Y,X),
we can apply conversion to the rule sc : ¬in f (s)→Y p to derive elimsup(D) `+∆X p.
For the other direction, i.e., elimsup(D) ` +∆X p (for p ∈ Σ) then D ` +∆X p, the
proof is again by induction on the length of derivations.
The inductive base is trivial since the only possible derivation for a modal literal
X p in Σ is only when X p ∈ F , and thus X p is also a fact in D,
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For the inductive bases, P(n+1) = +∆X p we have that for every literal in Σ which
is not a fact, ∃r ∈ R such that either (i) ¬in f (r) →X p or (ii) ¬in f (r) →Y p is in
elimsup(D). In addition we have a rule A(r)→BEL ¬in f (r).
For (i) in the proof we have ∀a∈ A(r),+∆a∈ P(1..n), thus by inductive hypothesis
D ` +∆a, which makes applicable the rule r : A(r)→X p. For (ii) to derive +∆X p
from ¬in f (r)→Y p, we must have +∆X¬in f (r) ∈ P(1..n), which means that we have
+∆X a ∈ P(1..n) for all a ∈ A(r). Again by inductive hypothesis we have D ` +∆X a
for all a ∈ A(r), and r is A(r)→Y p were Convert(Y,X). Therefore D `+∆X p.
The proof for −∆X is analogous and uses the same ideas of conversion from the
case for +∆ and the basic structure from the proof for the transformation that removes
the superiority relation from [3].
The proof of the case for +∂ is essentially the same as that given in [3]. The
only difference is in the iterative construction of the sets of maximal applicable rules,
the existence of such sets is guaranteed by the clause of the proof conditions saying
t > s. If a rule r is maximal applicable then either ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂a or ∀a ∈ A(r),+∂X a
(applicable condition), and there is no applicable rule s such that s > r. Thus all rules
¬in f (s) ↪→BEL in f (r) are discarded while the rule A(r) ↪→BEL ¬in f (r) is applicable,
thus we prove either +∂BEL¬in f (r) or +∂X¬in f (r). Thus every rule ¬in f (r)⇒BEL
in f (t), is applicable, this means that we prove −∂Z¬in f (t) for all Z ∈ MOD. The
main points here is that BEL converts universally and that there are conflict between
all pairs of modalities. Accordingly the rule tc, attacking a rule for p is discarded.
Using all rules in the maximal applicable sets we can show that all rules attacking p
are discarded, and that we have at least one applicable rule for p. The proof for −∂
has the same structure of that given in [3] for the same case and the construction just
outlined for the case +∂ .
DEFINITION 16. Let D=(F,R,>) be a modal defeasible theory, and Σ be the language
of D. Define elimdft = (F,R′,>′) where
R′ =
⋃
r∈R
elimdft(r)
and
elimdft(r)=

{r+ : A(r) ↪→BEL p+,r− : A(r) ↪→BEL ¬p−,r : p+ ↪→X p} r ∈ RXsd [p]
{r− : A(r) ↪→BEL p−,r+ : A(r) ↪→BEL ¬p+,r : p− ↪→X ¬p} r ∈ RXsd [¬p]
{r : A(r)⇒BEL ¬p−} r ∈ Rdft[p]
{r : A(r)⇒BEL ¬p+} r ∈ Rdft[¬p]
and the superiority relation >′ is defined by the following conditions:
∀r′,s′ ∈ R′(r′ >′ s′ ⇐⇒ ∃r,s ∈ R : r′ ∈ elimdft(r),s′ ∈ elimdft(s),r > s)
where r and s are conflicting.
For each atom p ∈ Σ, p+ and p− are new atoms, i.e., thy do not appear in Σ.
Furthermore all new atoms generated are distinct.
THEOREM 3. The transformation elimdft is correct.
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PROOF. Notice that the transformation elimdft is essentially the same transformation
as that given in [3]. The only difference is that the rules p+ ↪→X p and p− ↪→X ¬p
are modalised with X instead of BEL. However, this difference is flattened by the
definition of social agents, where BEL converts universally and the all modalities are
involved in conflicts.
(2) Rule Loader The rule loader builds a data structure as follows: for every atom
α ∈UD we create three entries α , INTα and OBLα . Each entry has associated to it a
list of hash tables:
For α we have
• +h is a list of (pointers to) rules in RBEL where α appears in the head;
• −h is the list of rules in RBEL where ∼α appears in the head;
• +b is the list of rules in R where α occurs in the body;
• −b is the list of rules in R where ∼α occurs in the body.
For Xα , X ∈ {INT,OBL} we have
• +h is a list of rules in RX where α appears in the head;
• −h is the list of rules in RX where ∼α appears in the head;
• +hB is a list of rules in RBEL where α appears in the head;
• −hB is a list of rules in RBEL where ∼α appears in the head;
• +b is the list of rules in R where Xα occurs in the body;
• −b is the list of rules in R where X∼α occurs in the body.
• +b∼ is the list of rules in R where ∼Xα occurs in the body;
• −b∼ is the list of rules in R where ∼X∼α occurs in the body.
To each rule in RX , X 6= BEL, we associate a structure consisting of a (modal) literal
(the head of the rule) and a set of pointers to the modal literals in the body of the rule,
implemented as an hash table; while for belief rules we create the same structure as the
other types of rules plus two other structures one for INT and one for OBL, the single
pointer refers to the modal literal and the set of pointers corresponds to the literals in
the body modalised, respectively, with INT and OBL.
(3) The Inference Engine The Inference Engine is based on an extension of the
Delores algorithm/implementation proposed in [25] as a computational model of Basic
Defeasible Logic. In turn
1. It asserts each fact (as an atom) as a conclusion and removes the atom from
the rules where the atom occurs positively in the body, and it “deactivates” the
rules where either the atom occurs negatively in the body, or incompatible modal
literals occur in the body.
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2. It scans the list of active rules for rules where the body is empty. It takes head
and searches for rule (of the appropriate type) where the head is the negation of
the atom or a modal literal incompatible with it. If there are no such rules then,
the atom is appended to the list of facts, and removed from the rules.
3. It repeats the first step.
4. The algorithm terminates when one of the two steps fails. On termination the
algorithm outputs the set of conclusions.8
It is immediate to see that the algorithm runs in linear time. Each (modal) atom/literal
in a theory is processed exactly once and every time we have to scan the set of rules,
thus the complexity of the above algorithm is O(|UD| ∗ |R|).
Given the above result it might seem that social agents are computationally feasible.
However, as we have seen in the previous sections there are situations (let us call them
deviant situations) where social agents do not behave as expected. First of all, we have
to identify when we have a deviant situation and what are the reasons why we have
them, and what kind of control an agent has over them. Here we assume that a deviant
situation depends on some primitive intentions of an agent (i.e., intentions given as
facts). Since these intentions are independent of the policy the theory describe the only
alternative a social agent has is to give up some of them. In the rest of the section we
study whether this is possible and what price an agent has to pay to be social. The
answer is negative; we will provide a theory that is essentially deviant, and we will
show that social agents are (computationally) expensive.
A precise definition of the problem is provided in the next section.
5.3 Restoring Sociality Problem
INSTANCE:
Let I be a finite set of primitive intentions, OBLp a primary obligation, and
D a theory such that I ⊆ F , D ` −∂OBL p, D ` −ΣOBL∼p, D ` +∂INT∼p,
D `+ΣOBL p and D ` −ΣBEL∼p.
QUESTION:
Is there a theory D′ equal to D apart from containing only a proper subset
I′ of I instead of I, such that ∀q if D ` +∂OBLq then D′ ` ∂OBLq and
D′ `+∂OBL p?
The specification of the problem is meant to formalise the situation we have de-
scribed in the previous sections. The combination of the proof tags in the specifica-
tion of the instance is only possible in case there is an applicable deontic rule for p
(+ΣOBL p) such that (i) would be otherwise unchallenged –i.e., there are no deontic
rules to support∼p (−ΣOBL∼p); (ii) there are no reasons to believe the opposite of the
conclusion of the deontic rule; (iii) but the deontic rule is defeated, against the sociality
8This algorithm outputs ∂+; ∂− can be computed by an algorithm similar to this with the “dual actions”.
For ∆+ we have just to consider similar constructions where we examine only the first parts of step 1 and 2.
∆− follows from ∆+ by taking the dual actions.
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of the agent, by the intentionality of ∼p obtained as a consequence of an intention of
the agent (this means it has been obtained by converting a belief rule into an intention
rule). In other terms a potentially valid obligation is blocked by a consequence of an
intentional behaviour.
EXAMPLE 5. Let us the consider the theory consisting of
F = {INTp, INTs}
R = {r1 : p,s⇒BEL q r2 : ⇒OBL ∼q r3 : ⇒BEL s}
>= {r1 > r2}
r1 is a belief rule and so the rule is stronger than the deontic rule r2. In addition we
have that the belief rule is not applicable (i.e., −ΣBELq) since there is no way to prove
+∂BEL p. There are no deontic rules for q, so −∂OBLq. However, rule r1 behaves as
an intention rule since all its antecedent can be proved as intentions, i.e., +∂INT p and
+∂INTs. Hence, since r1 is stronger than r2, the derivation of +∂OBL∼q is prevented
against the sociality of the agent.
The related decision problem is whether it is possible to avoid the “deviant” be-
haviour by giving up some primitive intentions, retaining all the (primary) obligations,
and maintaining a set of primitive intentions as close as possible to the original set of
intentions.
EXAMPLE 5. (CONTINUED). When we examine the theory we notice that both primi-
tive intentions concur to the prevention of the derivation of +∂OBL∼q. These intentions
are under the control of the agent. The agent has the opportunity to avoid the deviant
behaviour if she gives up at least one of her primitive intentions. Accordingly, the
agent has three alternatives: to give up INTp, to give up INTs, or to give up both. The
first two options minimise the difference between the original theory and the resulting
theory.
There could be cases where, no matter what intentions are removed, the theory will
result in a deviant situation. The simplest case is where there are intentions that are at
the same time primitive and primary.
EXAMPLE 6. Let the theory D be
F = {INTp}
R = {r1 : ⇒INT p r2 : p⇒BEL q r3 : ⇒OBL ∼q}
>= {r2 > r3}
In this theory we have only one primitive intention and therefore the only way to see
whether it is possible to avoid the problem is to give up that intention. However, we
have that r1 is an intention rule for p, and thus we can use it to derive +∂INT p, which
allows r2 to be used to derive an intention instead of a belief, and consequently to
prevent the derivation of an obligation against the sociality of the agent.
Notice that, given the non-monotonic nature of defeasible logic, it is possible that
a solution to the problem is given by a superset of the original set of intentions instead
of a subset.
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EXAMPLE 7. Given a theory D as follows
F = {INTa, INTb}
RBEL = {r1 : INTa⇒BEL d, r2 : INTb⇒BEL d,
r3 : INTc⇒BEL ∼d, r4 : d⇒BEL e}
RINT = {r5 : ⇒INT a, r6⇒INT b}
ROBL = {r7 : ⇒OBL ∼e}
>= {r3 > r1,r3 > r2,r4 > r7}
As we have seen in the previous example, throwing away the two primitive intentions
is of no avail, they are reinstated by the intention rules r5 and r6. However, to block the
side effect d of the two intentions we can introduce a further primitive intention, INTc.
If we replace the theory D by a theory D′ obtained from D by emptying the set of
intention rules, then we have two alternatives to avoid the deviance. The first is to drop
both the primitive intentions INTa and INTb, or we can form a new primitive intention
INTc. In this case the theory obtained from adding the new intention is, intuitively,
more similar to the original theory than the theory obtained from dropping the two
primitive intentions.
Variations of the problem can be obtained by changing other parameters of the
specification. Some of these can define new types of agents. For example a pro-active
social agent might try to recover from a deviant situation by changing the raw facts
(facts that are neither primitive intentions nor primitive obligations). Thus a pro-active
social agent tries to adapt the environment to her goals (intentions). A legalistic so-
cial agent, on other the hand, might change the set of primitive obligations, while a
cheating social agent might change the rules. However, it is important to realise that
all these variations have a structure isomorphic to the specification we discuss in this
paper. In addition it is possible to generalise the problem to the case of multiple deviant
behaviours.
THEOREM 4. The Restoring Sociality Problem is NP-complete.
PROOF. We have to show that the problem is both NP and NP-hard. For the NP part
all we have to do is to notice that we can guess a theory, we compute the extension of
the theory in linear time (Theorem 1) and then verify in linear time whether the restore
conditions are satisfied.
For the NP-hard part we have to map a known NP-complete problem to the Restor-
ing Sociality Problem. Here we use the knapsack problem [14, Problem MP9].
Knapsack Problem
INSTANCE:
Given a finite set U , for each u∈U a size s(u)∈Z+ and a value v(u)∈Z+,
and integer B and K.
QUESTION:
Is there a subset U ′ ⊆U such that ∑u∈U ′ s(u)≤ B and ∑u∈U ′ v(u)≥ K?
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The knapsack problem is encoded by a defeasible theory D where R is as follows:
• INTload(u)⇒BEL load(u) for each u ∈U .
• ∑s(u):D`+∂BELload(u) s(u)> B⇒INT overload
• ∑s(u):D`+∂BELload(u) v(u)< K⇒INT undervalue
• overload⇒BEL ¬good
• undervalue⇒BEL ¬good
• ⇒OBL good
F is given by the relationship INTload(u) ∈ F iff u ∈U ′.
The theory of the above construction has several interesting properties. First of all
D `+∂BELload(u) iff INTload(u) ∈ F , which means u ∈U ′; then D `+∂OBLgood iff
either of the two conditions of the knapsack problem are satisfied; notice that since
there are no literals for ¬load(u), the computation of the rule INTload(u) ⇒BEL
load(u) can be computed independently of the rest of the theory thanks to the mod-
ularity of DL [3], thus the sums in the antecedent of the second and third rule can
be considered as “facts” in the theory. In case one of the condition of the knapsack
problem is not satisfied we have exactly a deviant situation as in the restoring social-
ity problem. The encoding of the knapsack problem in DL is clearly linear, thus any
algorithm that solves the restoring sociality problem in polynomial time will solve the
knapsack problem in polynomial time. Therefore the restoring sociality problem is
NP-complete.
5.4 Revising Deviant Situations
In this paper we focused on what we called social agents, i.e., agents who refrain from
planning activities which may result in a violation of existing obligations. However,
we would like to stress out that the so called “restoring sociality problem”, and the
computational complexity results associated with it, is not specific to social agents, but
it depends on the structure of an agent type. In particular any agent type defined by the
following parameters
Convert(X ,Y ),Conflict(X ,Z),Conflict(X ,Y ),Conflict(Z,Y )
suffers from the same problem (of course with a different intuitive reading of the prob-
lem).
In a similar way the transformations to remove defeaters and to empty the superi-
ority relation, as well as the general complexity result for the logic obtain for all agent
types (modal defeasible logic variants) isomorphic to social agents.
A first solution to the complexity of social agents is to avoid conversions. However,
we believe that this is a rather unsatisfactory approach for agents with both internal (in-
tentions) and external (obligations) motivational attitudes. It is not possible to capture
the notion of intentionality which is of paramount importance when we deal with agents
situated in normative contexts.
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A second solution would be to assume that belief rules behaving as intention
rules (i.e., obtained from the conversion Convert(BEL, INT)) are always weaker than
deontic rules or belief rules behaving as deontic rules (i.e., where the conversion
Convert(BEL,OBL) applies). In this case the problem is with theory like
r1 : a⇒BEL q r2 : b⇒BEL ∼q
+∂INTa +∂OBLb
r1 > r2
where r1 is at the same time stronger and weaker than r2.
6 Related Work
This article provides an extensive proposal of how DL can be extended to model cog-
nitive agents interacting with obligations. In this sense, it is the final result of a series
of earlier works [18, 10, 11, 19]. In [10, 11] DL is extended by introducing the⊗ oper-
ator to represent explicit violations and contrary-to-duty reasoning. Cognitive profiles
of agents are characterised by their beliefs, desires, intentions and obligations. A large
agent type classification is developed accordingly. In [18] a similar picture of agents is
presented but desires are defined as literals supported by (but not necessarily derived
from) reasoning chains of rules for intention. In addition, an operator for intentional
and successful action is introduced. In all these works conflicts are simply modelled
by using standard superiority relation (>) of DL, and so it is never admitted that we
can derive, for example, INTa and OBL¬a. Moreover, conversions are not discussed
in connection with the problem of side effects and no complexity result is offered. In
[19], too, conflicts are simply modelled via the standard superiority relation. However,
some preliminary discussion on the side-effect problem is developed and complexity
results about the logic and social agents are sketched. Hence, the present article directly
extends the analysis of [19]: it offers a more comprehensive discussion on intentional
side effects and conversions, adopts a different and more general method for dealing
with conflicts, proposes full proofs for complexity results, and suggests hints about
how the problem of social agents also concerns other agent types.
Reasoning about mental attitudes is a central issue in philosophy and AI. Despite
the plethora of proposals devoted to this topic, the related work that is directly relevant
for this paper is mainly the BOID architecture. In fact, the basic calculation scheme
used in BOID [8] is similar to the one proposed in this paper: as done in BOID, we
distinguish conflicts between rules for the same modality and for different modalities.
In the second case, the relation Conflict(X ,Y ) assumes that X rules are always stronger
than Y ’s.
The BOID framework has four components representing respectively the beliefs
(B), obligations (O), intentions (I) and desires (D) of the agent. The behaviour of each
component is specified by sets of propositional logical formulas often in the form of
defeasible rules. BOID identifies two general types of conflicts that could arise ei-
ther within each component (internal conflicts) or between the components (external
conflicts). These two types of general conflicts are further subdivided into different
subtypes which gives rise to several possible conflicts among the mental attitudes. In
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order to solve possible conflicts among the attitudes an ordering function (ρ) is defined
on rules based on the agent type. An agent type is determined by allowing one compo-
nent to overrule others. For example, a realistic agent type can be defined by having an
ordering in which the belief component overrules any other component (BOID, BODI,
BDIO etc.). This means that in BOID a conflict resolution type is an order of over-
ruling and in general the order of derivation can be used to identify different types of
agents. Agent types like simple-minded (agent type where prior intentions overrule de-
sires and obligations), social (agent type where obligations overrule desires) etc. could
be defined in a similar manner. Formally an agent type is defined as a function, ρ that
assigns a unique integer to each rule. It should be noted that the ordering function ρ as-
signs unique values to the rules of all components such that the values of all rules from
one component are either smaller or greater than the values of all rules from another
component.
Besides the specific result discussed in Section 5.3, the general aspects that differ-
entiate the current framework from BOID’s are the following:
• our proof conditions permit to derive modalised literals; accordingly, in addition
to labelling rules by the elements of MOD, modalities are also made explicit in
rule antecedents, thus enriching the expressive power of the logic;
• conversions are introduced to capture some fundamental reasoning patterns
which, in most cases, should be admitted or which may in any case contribute to
characterise agent types;
• we admit that Conflict may cover only some modalities; this makes it possible
that, for any rule types X and Y that are not covered by Conflict, we can obtain
+∂X p and +∂Y∼p;
• our logic for BIO agents has linear complexity, whereas to our knowledge there
is no analogous result for BOID.
7 Summary
In conclusion, let us summarise step by step the aims and results of this article.
Our preliminary step was to describe agent’s deliberation by considering her
policy-based motivations, which are triggered by potentially recurring circumstances
in agent’s life. In particular, we extended Bratman’s model of policy-based intentions
to also cover beliefs and obligations. It turned out that this type of motivations are
easily captured by a rule-based approach to cognitive agents.
Secondly, on account of this definition of motivations, we discussed some aspects
of the so-called side-effect problem. In contrast with the idea that side effects are
never intended, we argued that there are conceptual reasons for arguing that some side
effects should be intended, at least according a realistic model of agent’s rationality. We
maintained that the inclusion of some side-effects in the intentional sphere of agents
does not endanger the logical analysis but, on the contrary, is beneficial to explain
notions, such as intentionality and responsibility, of paramount importance for agents
situated in normative and legal contexts.
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Thirdly, the logical framework has been presented. Before providing a rigorous
definition of the formal language and proof conditions, we informally introduced the
concept of rule conversion, according to which we can derive some motivations by us-
ing rules devised for inferring different motivations. In addition, we discussed methods
for dealing with rule conflicts. An intermediate summary was provided to outline our
logical intuitions and match them with the conceptual issues regarding the side-effect
problem. We argued that conversions are a natural way to include or exclude side
effects.
Fourthly, we illustrated the notion of agent type. Classically, agent types are char-
acterised by stating conflict resolution types in terms of orders of overruling between
rules. For example, an agent is realistic when rules for beliefs override all other com-
ponents; she is social when obligations are stronger than the other motivational com-
ponents with the exception of beliefs. We argued that agent types are not only useful in
devising mechanisms for solving conflicts, but are of theoretical interest, as they define
the cognitive profile of agents. We focused in particular on social agents.
Fifthly, we investigated the computational properties of our logical framework.
First of all, we showed the computational feasibility of the logic: we have demon-
strated that it has linear complexity. As far as we know this is the first result of this
kind for cognitive agents. We then moved to critically examining the concept of social
agent, but we argued that our considerations can be easily applied to the other agent
types: in fact, the analysis was mainly formal and independent of what motivational
factors (such as intentions and obligations) are considered. In particular, we proved
that the classical notion of agent type is not satisfactory: in presence of conversions,
which seem necessary to deal with the side-effect problem, conflict resolutions cannot
be limited to examining pairs of rules having complementary literals in their heads,
but we need to consider all possible reasoning chains supporting conclusions. This
problem turned out to be very expensive from the computational point of view. Again,
this is the first result of this kind we are aware of. In addition, although we showed
that this difficulty formally holds for DL only, we also argued that similar problems af-
fect any rule-based defeasible formalism which incorporates conversions or analogous
inferential mechanisms.
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